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Greek Labor Force Survey (2009). The main objective is to explore how much of the differential 
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1. Introduction 
 
The collapse of the USSR, the consequent collapse of all the communist countries and the 
Yugoslav wars in the 1990’s caused a massive influx of immigrants from these countries towards 
Southern Europe and in Greece in particular. In addition, the gap in wages and living conditions 
between the South and the North Europe has been gradually narrowing over the last three 
decades, making the South European countries a desirable destination for immigration. Today, 
Greece is the main route of illegal immigrants1 from Middle East, Africa and southern Asia who 
seek entry into Western Europe.  
According to the 2001 Census of Population, foreign population is estimated at 797,0002 or 
about 7% of total population. Today, the immigrants’ share is estimated at about 10%. 
Immigrants from Albania (57.5%), Bulgaria (4.6%), Georgia (3.0%), Romania (2.6%) and Russia 
(2.3%) are the majority among the immigrant population (Cholezas and Tsakloglou, 2006). 
Moreover, about 80 percent of immigrants are unskilled and medium skilled workers. 
These masses of unskilled immigrants give rise to issues such as their economic integration 
and equal treatment in the Greek labor market. The economic performance of foreign workers is 
of fundamental importance for the well being of immigrants themselves and the cohesion of the 
host society. The principle of equality in payment irrespective of racial or ethnic origin has been 
implemented by the Racial Equality Directive (2000/43/EU) which came into place in 2000. This 
Directive complements the anti-discrimination law on gender discrimination, which was 
introduced by the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty (1999).  Nevertheless, it is widely believed 
that immigrants are employed for wages that are significant lower than the wages of Greek 
workers (see e.g. Lianos et al., 1996; Fakiolas, 1999). 
                                               
1 According to the Hellenic Migration Policy Institute (IMEPO) the number of illegal migrants is estimated at about 
400,000. 
2 Attiki2 (53.6%) and Central Macedonia (13.6%) appear to be the regions where the concentration of immigrants is 
the highest. 
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Consequently, the main objective of this paper is to examine the factors that explain the wage 
gap between immigrants and natives. Moreover, we are also interested in the assimilation of 
immigrants and the influence it has on the earnings differential. To the best of our knowledge, no 
other study has been carried out on the assimilation of immigrants on the Greek labor market3. To 
this end, we proceed by applying the Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) decomposition technique 
by employing data from the Greek Labor Force Survey (2009).  
The only study that employs the Blinder and Oaxaca methodology for Greece is that of 
Demoussis et al. (2010). Our paper differs form the study of Demoussis et al. in several important 
ways. Firstly, in our analysis we follow closely de Coulon’s (2001) alternate decomposition 
methodology. This framework allows us to analyze the ethnical gap in payment into a part 
attributed to observed characteristics, a part due to difference in coefficients and examine how 
education and experience before and after immigration affect the results and therefore to 
highlight the immigrants’ assimilation process in the Greek labor market. On the contrary, the 
analysis of Demoussis et al. is based on the assumption that the quality of human capital of 
immigrants is identical to that of natives. Secondly, we distinguish immigrants into three groups: 
(i) immigrants originating from EU countries, (ii) immigrants originating from non-EU countries 
and (iii) immigrants that terminated education in Greece. The rationale behind this strategy is that 
there exist significant differences in the levels and the quality of human capital between 
immigrants coming from EU and non-EU countries. Moreover, we consider immigrants that have 
completed formal education in Greece as the most assimilated group of immigrants and we 
expect that they are the group exposed to lower levels of discrimination in terms of wages. 
Thirdly, Demoussis et al. employ data from the Greek Household Budget (2004-2005), while our 
examination employs data from the Labor Force Survey. 
Our main results are as follows. When we consider the group of non-EU immigrants we find 
that 39 percent of the mean wage gap is due to differences in the observed characteristics. 
                                               
3 However, as far as native-immigrant wage differentials are concerned, see Lianos et al, 1996; Demoussis et al, 
2010; Drydakis and Vlasssis, 2010. 
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Moreover, we provide empirical evidence that the returns to schooling and experience in Greece 
are higher than those in the countries of origin. On the other hand, the explained part is around 67 
percent for the immigrants originating from EU countries. In addition, we find that the 
differences in education and experience do have an impact on the reported results. More 
precisely, the explained part due to education (experience) is higher (lower) for the group of 
immigrants originating from non-EU countries than it is for the EU immigrants. These results 
highlight the fact that EU immigrants have on average 1.5 more years of foreign schooling and 
2.1 less years of labor market experience in Greece than non-EU immigrants. Finally, as far as 
immigrants terminated education in Greece are concerned, we find that the part due to differences 
in coefficients is negative, that is, they experience positive discrimination. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In the next Section we present the 
theoretical considerations and a review of the empirical literature. Section 3 describes the data. In 
Section 4 we discuss the methodology followed in order to decompose the average earnings 
differentials between natives and immigrants. Moreover, we proceed by explaining the strategy 
followed in order to address the sample selection bias. In Section 5, we report the results from the 
regressions of the earnings equations. In section 6 we report the results from the decomposition 
analysis. Finally, section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
There are two classes of economic models that have been developed to explain the sources of 
race differences in labor market outcomes – discrimination models in which discriminatory 
treatment of minority groups leads to lower wages and reduced employment opportunities and 
assimilation models in which immigrants upon arrival face inferior labor market prospects 
relative to natives due to limited transferability of human capital across countries. Section 2.1 
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presents a brief review of theoretical and empirical studies on the issue of discrimination. In 
Section 2.2, we proceed by making a review of the literature on assimilation. 
 
2.1 Discrimination  
According to Alonji and Blank (1999) economic models of discrimination may be divided 
into two broad categories: one of competitive models in which an agent acts individually (taste-
based and statistical discrimination) and one of collective models in which one group acts 
collectively against another.  
The seminal model of Becker (1971) on taste-based discrimination formalizes the idea that 
some employers are prejudiced against at least some members of a minority group. 
Discriminating employers consider the cost to be both the wage and the disutility from hiring a 
member of the minority group and employ minority workers only if they accept lower wage for 
identical productivity. Hence, this model generates a wage gap between native and immigrant 
groups, while at the same time discriminating employers earn lower profits than non-
discriminators. Nevertheless, Becker points out that if there is free entry and constant returns to 
scale, then in the long-run unprejudiced employers will increase to the point that it is no longer 
necessary for minority workers to work for prejudiced employers (Alonji and Blank 1999). 
On the other hand, the statistical discrimination literature is based on the idea of imperfect 
knowledge about the qualifications and the productivity of an agent (Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973). 
The hiring and pay decisions are influenced by prior beliefs about the productivity of group 
members. Hence, a member of a group that is considered as more productive tends to be paid 
more than a member of a group that is considered as less productive. However, Aigner and Cain 
(1977) argue that such mistaken behavior is not compatible with the profit maximizing behavior 
of firms.  
Finally, a strand of the literature is concerned with the fact that some groups of workers may 
be crowded into lowering paying occupations, i.e. occupational segregation (Alonji and Blank, 
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1999). One possibility is more severe employer discrimination in one occupation than in another. 
A second possibility, relative to collective action, is that some groups have limited access towards 
sectors characterized by high wages, either because social norms or because institutional 
regulations. Hence, occupational segregation may then generate wage differentials between 
native and immigrant workers.  
The most prominent approach to identify discrimination between natives and immigrants is 
the decomposition methodology suggested by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973). The approach 
is based on the estimation of two separate earnings equations for each group, which are then used 
in the estimation of the wage gap due to differences in observed characteristics (explained part) 
and due to differences in coefficients which is referred as discrimination (see e.g. Kidd, 1993; 
Golder, 2000; Nielsen, 2000; Nielsen et al, 2004; Lang, 2000; Aldashev et al, 2008) 
 
2.2 Assimilation  
Economic assimilation is defined as the catching up process of immigrants with natives in 
terms of earnings with additional time of residence. The rationale behind assimilation is that 
immigrants often lack country-specific human capital which leads to an initial wage gap between 
natives and immigrants. However, as years since migration elapse, immigrants acquire skills 
relevant to the labor market in the host country that gradually increase the immigrants’ wages at a 
rate higher than that of natives. 
One of the first empirical studies examining the impact of assimilation on the earnings of 
immigrants is the pioneering study of Chiswick (1978). Chiswick (1978) sets as dependent 
variable the natural logarithm of hourly wage and investigates the impact of years since 
migration. This study provides empirical evidence that the earnings of immigrants catch up to 
those of natives within 15 years. Borjas (1985) challenged this finding by pooling the 1970 and 
1980 census data and examining the earnings growth of different cohorts of immigrants. The 
empirical findings provide evidence that recent cohorts experience lower earnings growth than 
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natives and earlier cohorts of immigrants. Friedberg (2000) argues that education and labor 
market acquired abroad are valued significantly less than human capital obtained domestically. 
Using the Israeli Censuses of Population (1972 and 1983) she concludes that investing in human 
capital after immigration raises significantly the earnings of immigrants. Finally, Sanroma et al, 
2009 provide empirical evidence that the returns to human capital obtained in Spain are 
significantly higher than the returns to human capital acquired in the countries of origin. 
Kee (1995) combined the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition with the assimilation approach a la 
Chiswick (1978) –by controlling for differences in education and experience acquired before and 
after immigration- in order to analyze the native immigrant earnings gap in the Netherlands. The 
empirical results provide evidence that discrimination is present against Antilleans and Turks 
while the part of the wage gap due to differences in observed characteristics is dominated by the 
effect of the relatively low number of school years acquired in the Netherlands. Finally, de 
Coulon (2001) using a similar strategy analyzes the average wage differentials between 
immigrants and the Swiss workers. This study provides strong evidence that education is the 
major determinant of the difference in the observed characteristics 
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
For the purpose of our analysis we make use of the information provided by the Greek Labor 
Force Survey (2009)4. Since we are interested in earning differentials, the sample is restricted to 
individuals working in the wage and salary sector, whose age lies between 18 and 65. The lower 
age limit is chosen because 18 is the legal minimum working age. The upper age limit is chosen 
because 65 is the average retirement age in Greece. We keep in our sample only males because it 
is difficult to isolate the effect of gender discrimination on ethnic discrimination. We also exclude 
self-employed workers since their earnings include returns to capital and they usually do not 
                                               
4 The sample contains 74,293 individuals of which 4,855 (6.5%) are immigrants. 
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report or underreport their earnings. Furthermore, we exclude unemployed, retirees and 
individuals out of workforce. After excluding also the cases where there are missing 
observations, we end up with a sample of 8,429 individuals of which 1,185 are immigrants. 
Finally, we chose to distinguish immigrants into two broad categories – those originating from 
EU and those originating from non-EU countries- because there are substantial differences 
between them with respect to the levels of education, experience and years since migration (see 
Table 2 below). We also expect that formal education and training obtained in EU countries is of 
higher quality than the human capital acquired in non-EU countries. 
Since the LFS questionnaire provides information on monthly earnings, in order to construct 
a measure of hourly earnings we divided monthly earnings by 4.45 multiplied with the number of 
hours worked. The LFS also provides information on the level of education completed and the 
year when education was terminated. Utilizing this information, we assigned the total number of 
school years between the range of 0 and 206. Furthermore, a measure of potential labor market 
experience is computed from age 18 onwards equal as age minus 6 minus years of schooling7. 
Finally, when we consider immigrants’ human capital, we distinguished between education and 
experience acquired before and after immigration based on the question about years since 
immigration. 
The other control variables are the standard dummy variables used in the empirical literature 
of the wage determination process (see e.g. Kee, 1995; de Coulon, 2001). Specifically, we 
employ dummies indicating: (i) the marital status (denoted as married), (ii) sex (male), (iii) 
whether an individual is considered as the head of a household (household head), (iv) whether an 
individual has managerial duties, (v) whether an individual is employed in firms which employ 
between 10 and 50 employees (medium firm) and (vi) whether an individual is employed in firms 
                                               
5 4.4 indicates the number of weeks in a month. 
6 The lower limit indicates workers without formal education and the upper limit indicates Ph.D graduates. 
7 We subtract 6 because primary education begins at the age of 6 years.  
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which employ more than 50 workers (large firm), Finally, we also employ eight occupational 
dummies. 
 
Table 1. Variables definition 
Variable Description 
Schooling total years of education completed 
Experience years of work experience 
(Exp2)   years of work experience squared 
Manager 
(0,1) 
Dummy=1 if an individual is in charge of a certain group of tasks and has a staff 
of people who report to him 
Head of 
Household 
(HH) 
Dummy=1 if an individual is the principal income earner of the household 
Male (0,1) Dummy=1 if gender = male 
Married (0,1) Dummy=1 if married 
Medium (0,1) if the individual  is working at a firm that employs between 10 and 50 employees 
Large (0,1) if the individual is working at a firm that employs more than 50 employees 
Residual 
income 
the difference between the family income (the income of all members of 
household) and the income of the person who answer the questionnaire       
Children 
(0,1) 
Dummy=1 if the individual has at least one child 
 
Table 2 presents sample statistics for the variables used in the analysis. The average native 
hourly wage is 25.3 percentage points higher than the non-EU immigrants’ wage, and 23.9 
percentage points higher than the EU immigrants’ wage. Natives have on average 3.2 years more 
schooling than non-EU immigrants and 1.6 years more schooling than EU immigrants. Most 
school years obtained by immigrants are years acquired in their home country. The average total 
labor market experience for natives (22.6) is higher than total experience for non-EU and EU 
immigrants. The proportion of natives reported themselves as the head of a household and as 
married is lower than the proportion of immigrants. On the other hand, the proportion of natives 
reported themselves as managers, employed in medium and large firms is higher than the 
proportion of immigrants. Moreover, non-EU immigrants have on average 2 more years since 
migration than EU immigrants. Finally, the mean age of non-EU immigrants (EU immigrants) is 
5 (4.6) years lower than the mean age of natives.  
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Table 2. Means of variables: Male wage earners  
 Natives Non-EU immigrants EU Immigrants 
hourly wage (Euro) 7.1 5.3 5.4 
Total years of schooling 12.3 
(3.7) 
9.1 
(3.1) 
10.7 
(3.3) 
- in the home country   8.8   
(3.1) 
10.3 
(3.3) 
- in Greece  0.3   
(1.5) 
0.4 
(1.5) 
Terminated education in Greece (%)  12.1 22.1 
Total years of experience 22.6 
(11.9) 
20.7 
(9.5) 
19.2 
(10.3) 
- in the home country   10.7 
(8.4) 
11.4 
(9.2) 
- in Greece  9.9 
(4.7) 
7.8 
(5.1) 
married (%) 61.7 
(48.6) 
66.2 
(47.3) 
66.1 
(47.5) 
head of household (%) 72.1 
(44.9) 
77.8 
(41.6) 
83.1 
(37.7) 
manager (%) 14.2 
(34.9) 
2.1 
(14.6) 
3.7 
(18.9) 
Large firm (%) 18.5 
(38.8) 
3.2 
(17.7) 
4.4 
(20.1) 
Medium firm (%) 14.3 
(35.0) 
4.1 
(19.9) 
5.9 
(23.6) 
Age at migration  25.5 
(8.6) 
27.9 
(9.3) 
Years since migration  10.3 
(4.8) 
8.3 
(5.5) 
Age 40.7 
(10.8) 
35.7 
(9.4) 
36.1 
(10.3) 
Wage earners/total sample 7244/ 15626 1049/1320 136/186 
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses below the means. 
 
4. Empirical methodology 
 
4.1 Decomposition analysis 
We proceed our analysis by applying the Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) decomposition 
methodology (hereafter denoted as BO). The standard BO methodology for linear models 
decomposes the overall pay gap between two groups into a component explained by observable 
differences in human capital characteristics, and a component due to differences in coefficients, 
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which is usually referred as discrimination. The first step of the BO methodology, involves 
estimating a Mincer-type earnings funtion: 
iiii vXW  ln , i=N,M                           (1)  
where lnW denotes the natural logarithm of hourly wages, X is a matrix of the individual 
characteristics, and subscript i indicates the ethnic group (natives and immigrants, respectively). 
The mean wage difference can then be expressed as the difference in the linear prediction at the 
group-specific means of the regressors: 
 

 )()(lnln INIINNIN XXXWW                                              (2) 
where the first term on the right hand side of equation (2) represents the explained component, 
attributed to individual characteristics and the second term the unexplained component, attributed 
to potential discrimination. Decomposition (2) is expressed from the viewpoint of group N, that 
is, the differences in average characteristics are weighted by the coefficients of natives and the 
differences in coefficients are weighted by immigrants’ average characteristics. Alternatively, the 
differential can be expressed from the viewpoint of group I8. 
Decomposition (2) imposes the restriction that the native and immigrant model should be 
identically specified. However, immigrants have accumulated a part of their human capital in the 
country of origin. On the other hand, it is assumed that natives have acquired all of their skills in 
the home country. Hence, there are no native coefficients for schooling and experience in the 
immigrants’ country of origin.  In order to tackle the problem of unequal number of coefficients 
we follow de Coulon’s (2001) alternative decomposition which resemble the original 
decomposition of Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973): 
    
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8 See e.g. Cotton, 1988; Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994; Jann, 2008 for detailed reviews of different types of 
decomposition methodologies. 
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and, 
    
      
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where Ei and Di represent respectively the contribution of the observed characteristics and of the 
discrimination. The superscript c denotes the common characteristics of natives and immigrants, 
while the last four terms refer to education and experience.  
In (3), the term (E2) on the right-hand side measures the part of the gap due to differences in 
human capital characteristics. Specifically, it reflects the difference between natives’ human 
capital and immigrants’ human capital acquired abroad. The term (E3) represents the return to 
education and experience acquired in Greece if immigrants faced the non discriminatory wage 
structure. On the other hand, decomposition (4) attributes the explained gap to differences in 
human capital after immigration (E2), and the term (E3) which is considered as the return to 
human capital acquired abroad if immigrants were treated in a similar way as the natives.   
 
4.2 Sample selection bias correction 
The “true” wage differential between natives and immigrants can sometimes be different 
from the observed differential if the wage and salary earners are self-selected from a larger 
population. The omission of this selectivity bias leads to an underestimation or an overestimation 
of the discrimination (Reimers, 1983; Kee, 1995; de Coulon, 2001). 
To correct for sample selection bias, we adopt the Heckman’s (1979) two step method. The 
wage sample selection equation is added to the model in order to estimate potential sample 
selection bias:  
 iii uZE  *                                               (5) 
where *ijE  is the selection variable which is not observed whereas its sign is. Therefore, the 
selection mechanism becomes: 
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with ui,ei N[0,0,1,σ2ε,ρ] and Z  is a matrix of observable variables that includes at least one 
variable that is orthogonal to the wage determination process. In order to address the selection 
process in the wage and salary sector we follow the relevant literature (see e.g. Kee, 1995; de 
Coulon, 2001) and employ the following variables: (i) residual household income, (ii) years of 
schooling, (iii) years of labor market experience (and its square) and (iv) a dummy variable 
denoting the presence of children. Consequently, the empirical specification is augmented by the 
Heckman correction term: 
iiii vXw   ln                                                (8)  
where i  is the Heckman correction term
9 (or the inverse of Mill’s ratio). The sign of the 
Heckman’s correction term determines whether the observed wage is above or below the offered 
wage that would prevail if those unemployed, out of work force or self-employed, were wage and 
salary earners. Thus, a negative i  implies that the offered wage exceeds the observed wage and 
vice versa.  
 
5. Regression Results 
 
The empirical results from the regression of the earnings equation are presented in Table 3. 
The R-square ranges from 0.13 to 0.37 implying a relatively high explanatory power for the 
earnings equations. Coefficients of the inverse Mill’s ratio are negative for the three groups and 
                                               
9 The inverse of Mill’s ratio is given by: )(/)( iii XX   , where Φ(.) is the standard normal cumulative 
distribution function and φ(.) is the standard normal density function. 
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significant for natives. Hence, the offered native wages would have been higher if the excluded 
workers would be included in the wage and salary sector. The estimated coefficients of the 
human capital variables (schooling, experience and experience squared) for the group of natives 
are significant and have the expected sign. One more year of schooling increases the native wage 
by 0.022 log points. Experience has an inverted U-shaped effect on the wage. Moreover, natives 
employed as managers earn more than those workers without any responsibility. Married and 
those who are head of households are also rewarded more than the respective omitted categories. 
Employees in large and medium firms are better paid than those employed in small firms.  
 
Table 3. Estimated log wage equation, corrected for sample selection bias 
 Natives Non-EU immigrants EU Immigrants 
Schooling (home)  0.005                  
(0.004) 
-0.000    
 (0.013)   
Schooling (Greece)    0.022***                  
(0.001) 
0.017*   
 (0.008) 
-0.026    
 (0.025) 
Experience (home)  -0.000    
 (0.004) 
-0.015    
 (0.011) 
Experience (Greece) 0.018***                  
(0.001) 
0.020* 
(0.009) 
0.012    
 (0.014) 
Experience (home) 
squared 
 0.003    
 (0.014)   
0.060    
 (0.032) 
Experience (Greece) 
squared 
-0.018***                  
(0.003) 
-0.042    
 (0.042) 
  -0.025    
 (0.058) 
Married 0.032***                  
(0.011) 
0.000    
 (0.028) 
-0.032    
 (0.060)   
Medium firm 0.076***                  
(0.010)   
-0.086    
 (0.052) 
-0.039    
 (0.125)    
Large firm 0.082***                  
(0.010) 
  0.055    
 (0.057) 
-0.162    
 (0.126)   
Manager   0.041***                
(0.011) 
0.103    
 (0.070) 
0.257    
 (0.192)    
Head of household 0.057***                  
(0.012) 
0.136*** 
 (0.031) 
0.096    
 (0.083) 
Constant        1.328***                  
(0.034) 
1.277*** 
 (0.064) 
1.663*** 
 (0.163) 
lambda -0.045*                  
(0.024) 
-0.132    
 (0.126)   
-0.387    
 (0.409)    
Occupation 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared            0.370 0.130 0.212 
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses below the estimated coefficients. ***, **,* 
indicate significant at 1%,5%,10% significant levels 
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As far as the group of non-EU immigrants is concerned, column 2 shows that education and 
working experience obtained in Greece are significant determinants of the immigrant wage. On 
the other hand, years of schooling and years of potential experience acquired in the home 
countries are not statistically different from zero. When the group of EU immigrants is 
considered, column 3 shows that neither education nor experience has significant effects on the 
earnings. As can be seen, human capital turns out insignificant either obtained abroad or in 
Greece. Hence, considering the effect of human capital on immigrant earnings we could argue 
that it is not identical across countries. Finally, as it is evident in columns 2 and 3 the other 
explaining variables are not statistically different from zero but the variable head of household for 
the group of EU immigrants.  
 
6. Decomposition results 
 
The results of the decomposition using formula (3) are reported in table 4. To establish that 
the results are robust to sample selection bias we follow Heckman’s (1979) two step correction. 
Hence, the observed differences in mean wages differ from the offered differentials. When we 
consider the wage differential between natives and non-EU immigrants, the offered differential 
(0.28) is slightly lower than the observed differential (0.29). On the other hand, the adjusted 
differential (0.12) between natives and EU immigrants is 0.15 log points higher than the raw 
differential (0.27).  
For immigrants originating from non-EU countries the part due to differences in coefficients 
is about 61 percent. On the other hand, around 33 percent of the mean wage gap between natives 
and EU immigrants is attributed to discrimination.  
Our second task is to perform a detailed decomposition of the part attributed to differences in 
characteristics. For the group of non-EU immigrants, around 7 percent of the gap due to 
differences on characteristics or 25 percent of the total differential is explained by the difference 
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in education. For the group of EU immigrants the difference of education accounts for 50 percent 
of the explained gap or 33 percent of the total wage gap. When the total effects of education are 
further decomposed into a pre and post immigration part, we estimate that the difference of 
education accounts for 0.08 log points of the wage differential for non-EU immigrants and 0.05 
for EU immigrants. This result highlights the fact that the average school years of immigrants 
followed in the countries of origin are lower than the average years of schooling of the natives. 
 
 
Moreover, in Table 4, we observe the effect of total experience and its decomposition into a 
pre and post immigration parts. As it is evident, experience decreases the wage differential by 
0.03 log points for the group non-EU immigrants. On the other hand, the differential for the 
group EU immigrants remains intact by the differences on labor market experience. Moreover, 
the effect of experience in the countries of origin is very similar across the ethnic groups. This 
result highlights the fact that both foreign groups have around the same average years of 
experience in the countries of origin. Nevertheless, non-EU immigrants have on average two 
more years of experience in the Greek labor market than EU immigrants. This fact is reflected on 
Table 4. Detailed decomposition (3) of the native-immigrants wage gap 
 Non-EU 
immigrants 
EU 
Immigrants 
Mean wage gap 0.28 0.12 
Due to differences in coefficients 0.17 0.04 
Due to differences in characteristics 0.11 0.08 
- years of schooling in the home country 0.08 0.05 
- years of schooling in Greece -0.01 -0.01 
total schooling 0.07 0.04 
- years of experience in the home country 0.21 0.20 
- years of experience in Greece -0.17 -0.14 
- years of experience squared (home) -0.08 -0.08 
- years of experience squared (Greece) 0.02 0.02 
total experience -0.03 0.00 
- married 0.00 0.00 
- manager 0.00 0.00 
- household head 0.00 -0.01 
- size of firm 0.02 0.02 
- occupation dummies 0.05 0.04 
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the effect of years of experience in Greece. As can be seen, the differential for the non-EU 
immigrants is reduced by experience acquired in Greece by 0.03 log points more than it is 
reduced for EU immigrans.  
 
 
In Table 5 we proceed by applying the formula (4). As it is evident, the difference of 
education accounts for a large part of the wage differential. This result highlights the small 
average school years that immigrants followed in Greece. On the other hand, it is interesting to 
note that for non-EU immigrants education acquired in the countries of origin compensate 0.19 
log points of the differential. For EU immigrants education in the home countries compensates 
0.22 log points. As far as the impact of experience on the wage gap is concerned, the results again 
highlight the fact that EU immigrants have on average less years of labor market experience in 
Greece from a different point of view.  
 
 
 
Table 5. Detailed decomposition (4) of the native-immigrants wage gap 
 Non-EU 
immigrants 
EU 
Immigrants 
Mean wage gap 0.28 0.12 
Due to differences in coefficients 0.17 0.04 
Due to differences in characteristics 0.11 0.08 
- years of schooling in the home country -0.19 -0.22 
- years of schooling in Greece 0.26 0.26 
total schooling 0.07 0.04 
- years of experience in the home country -0.19 -0.20 
- years of experience in Greece 0.22 0.26 
- years of experience squared (home) 0.03 0.04 
- years of experience squared (Greece) -0.10 -0.10 
total experience -0.03 0.00 
- married 0.00 0.00 
- manager 0.00 0.00 
- household head 0.00 0.00 
- size of firm 0.02 0.02 
- occupation dummies 0.05 0.04 
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Table 6. Immigrants terminated education in Greece  
 
Means 
Estimated 
coefficients 
Decomposition of the wage 
gap 
Mean wage gap   0.20 
Due to differences in 
coefficients 
  -0.02 
Due to differences in 
characteristics 
  0.22 
hourly wage (Euro) 5.4   
Years of schooling 10.9 0.027*   
(0.01) 
0.03 
Years of experience 11.9 0.023    
 (0.01) 
0.19 
Experience squared  -0.027    
(0.03) 
-0.08 
Married 40.3 0.027 
(0.07) 
0.01 
Large firm 2.3 0.237 
(0.16) 
0.01 
Medium firm 7.8 0.085 
(0.11)    
0.01 
Manager 2.3 -0.092  
(0.18) 
0.01 
Head of household 42.6 0.061 
(0.08) 
0.02 
Occupation 
dummies 
 Yes 0.04 
lambda  -0.152 
(0.23) 
 
Age at migration 12.3   
Years since migration 14.2   
Age 29.1   
R-squared             0.433  
Wage earners/total sample 129/190   
 
In Table 6 we employ formula (2) in order to decompose the average wage differentials 
between natives and immigrants who terminated their formal education in Greece. Column (1) 
shows the sample statistics. As can be seen, natives have on average 1.4 more school years and 
10.7 more years of experience than immigrants. On the other hand, the average native is 11.6 
years older than the average immigrant. In column (2) the log of hourly wage is regressed on a set 
of variables outlined in section 4. As it is evident, education is more valued for this particular 
group of immigrants than it is for natives. As far as the rest of the explanatory variables are 
concerned, we observe that none of them is statistically different from zero. Column (3) reports 
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the results of the decomposition. As can be seen, the negative sign of the part due to differences 
in coefficients indicate that the pay gap would have been higher if immigrants were treated in a 
similar way as the natives, i.e. that immigrants have an earnings advantage over natives. 
Moreover, the difference in education accounts for a small part of the explained differential (13.6 
percent). Finally, differences on total years of labor market experience appear to explain a 
substantial part (50 percent) of the gap due to characteristics. This latter result, most probably is 
explained by the fact that immigrants are on average younger than natives. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The main objective of the present paper was to examine the determinants of the average wage 
differentials between natives and immigrants on the Greek labor market. Our dataset consists of 
cross-sectional data from the Greek Labor Force Survey (2009). Our analysis provides empirical 
evidence that the part of wage gap due to differences in coefficients is higher for the group of 
non-EU immigrants than it is for immigrants originating from EU countries. More precisely, 
differences in coefficients account for 61 percent of the total wage gap for the former and only 33 
percent for the latter. Moreover, we provide empirical evidence that the part due to differences in 
coefficients is negative (that is, positive discrimination) for immigrants who terminated education 
in Greece. 
As far as the effect of human capital is concerned, we find that the impact of human capital 
acquired abroad is insignificant either for EU or for non-EU immigrants. This result indicates the 
limited transferability of skills to the Greek labor market. On the contrary, the impact of 
education and experience acquired in Greece is found to be a significant determinant of the non-
EU immigrants’ wages, although the average school and experience years in Greece are very low 
(as in de Coulon, 2001). Differences on average years of schooling appear to explain a large part 
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of the average wage gap. On the other hand, our analysis provides evidence that experience do 
not exert a systematic impact on the average wage gap.  
When the analysis is carried out for the most assimilated group of immigrants, those who 
terminated formal education in Greece, we find that differences in labor market experience 
account for the largest part of the explained (and total) differential. On the other hand, the part 
due to differences in coefficients is negative, indicating that this particular group of immigrants 
has an earnings advantage compared to natives. 
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